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Susan Haack*

A Match Made on Earth: Getting
Real about Science and the Law**

Modern legal systems increasingly depend on scientific testimony; but they also
need somehow to ensure, so far as possible, that fact-finders aren't misled by
highly speculative, poorly-conducted, or dishonestly-presented science. The
Critical Common-sensist understanding of science that the author has developed
in Defending Science and elsewhere sheds some light on why these interactions
between law and science have proven so problematic. But Ms. Acharya's
approach to these difficult issues rests on a flawed conception of the supposed
"scientificmethod, "and an idea of legal "legitimacy" too weak to bear the weight
she places on it; and her claim that the author "idealizes" science is based on
serious misunderstandings.

Les systhmes judiciaires modernes s'en remettent de plus en plus aux
t6moignages de scientifiques; cependant, ils doivent 6galement s'assurer, dans
la mesure du possible, que les juges de faits ne sont pas induits en erreur par des
donndes scientifiques hautement sp~culatives, obtenues 6 l'aide de m6thodes
incorrectes ou pr6senthes de fagon pernicieuse. La description critique de la
science, fondde sur le gros bon sens, 6/aborde par l'auteur dans 'article intitule
Defending Science - (A la defense de la science) explique jusqu,' un certain
point pourquoi les interactions entre le droit et la science sont si problmatiques.
Par contre, la faqon qua Mme Acharya d'aborder ces problbmes complexes
repose sur une conception erronde de la prdtendue < mdthode scientifique - et
sur une idde de la 1gitimitd 14gale - trop faible pour supporter le poids qu'elle
lui impose. En outre, sa pr~tention que lauteure iddalise la science repose sur de
graves malentendus.
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A dog is content to turn around three times before lying
down, but a man would have to invent a rationalizationof
it. These explanationsare often fantastic and rationalistic
in the highest degree. There is not a single human
institutionwhich has not originatedin hit or miss fashion,
but nevertheless, every one ofthese institutionsisjust ifed
by some rationalizingargument as the best possible ...
-Percy Bridgman'
However just its laws, and however scrupulous its adherence to
procedure, without reasonably sound fact-finding a legal system is little
more than a cruel farce.2 And when factual questions relevant to the
determination of a case are scientific-e.g., what the probability is that
a match between the defendant's DNA and the DNA found at the crime
scene is random, or what the relative risk of a certain disease or disorder
is among those exposed to an allegedly toxic substance compared to those
not so exposed, etc., etc.-only the appropriate science can provide the
legal system with the answers it needs. So it's no wonder that, in both
criminal cases and civil, modem law increasingly relies on scientific
testimony of one kind and another.
But the work on which scientific testimony is based may be anywhere
from brilliant through competent to barely adequate, banal, poorly
conducted, biased, or even outright fabricated; scientific claims may
fall anywhere on a continuum from strongly warranted through weakly
warranted to wholly unwarranted by the evidence; and expert scientific
testimony may informed by strong science or by weak, and may be complete
and candid about possible sources of uncertainty or selectively chosen to
support one side of a case and presented with undue dogmatism. So it's
no wonder, either, that modem legal systems recognize the need to ensure
that, so far as possible, fact-finders aren't misled by badly conducted,
highly speculative, or dishonestly presented scientific testimony.

1. Percy W Bridgman, "The Struggle for Intellectual Integrity" in Reflections of a Physicist (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1955) 361 at 368.
2.
A point I made briefly in Susan Haack, "Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way" (2004) 49 Am J Juris 43; reprinted in Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 2d ed
(Amherst, NY. Prometheus Books, 2009) at 361. This is also a prominent theme in the work of Ronald
J Allen, most recently in "Rationality and the Taming of Complexity" in Michael Pardo, ed, Meador
Lectures on Rationality, University of Alabama School of Law (2010-2011) 69; and in Ronald J
Allen, "El desaflo conceptual de la prueba pericial" in M6nica Maria Bustamente Rfia, ed, Derecho
probatoriocontempordneo: Preuba cientificay tecnicasforenses (Medellin, Colombia: Universidad
de Medellin, 2012) 215.
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Over the last decade or so, I have done a good deal of work on issues
concerning scientific testimony,3 some of which, along with an article by
Professors Edmonds and Roach, Ms. Acharya uses as foil as she presents
her approach to "Law's Treatment of Science."4 Ms. Acharya is very
concerned about the danger of "idealizing" science, which she sees as
a threat to what she calls "the legitimacy of the legal system"; and she
maintains that what Edmonds, Roach, and I have written encourages such
idealization.
Whatever the case may be with Edmonds and Roach (who will, I
assume, take care of themselves), in my case this couldn't be more wrong.
At first, I was just baffled that anyone could misunderstand me as thoroughly
as Ms. Acharya has done. But then I realized that her reading of my work
is skewed by a very narrow view of science and its methods and an even
narrower view of law and its legitimacy-superficial understandings that,
among other things, assume sharp distinctions where, really, there are
important continuities; and that this problem is compounded by the fact
that she is apparently not aware that the couple of papers of mine she
refers to are part of a much larger, and intimately integrated, body of work.
So in what follows I will do my best to straighten things out: first
looking briefly at U.S. law on scientific testimony; next pointing out some
of the most serious problems with Ms. Acharya's conceptions of science
and of law; then sketching my own approach to these matters, which I
believe is both far more plausible and far more helpful; after that, taking
the opportunity to correct some of Ms. Acharya's worst misunderstandings
of my position; and finally, commenting very briefly on what seem to be
3.
Susan Haack, "An Epistemologist in the Bramble Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner"
(2001) 26:2 J Health Pol 217. "Trials and Tribulations: Science in the Law" (2003) 132 Daedalus
54. Defending Science-Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (Amherst, NY: Prometheus
Books, 2003) at ch 9. "Truth and Justice, Inquiry and Advocacy, Science and Law" (2004) 17:1 Ratio
Juris 15; reprinted in Haack, PuttingPhilosophyto Work: Inquiry andIts Placein Culture(Amherst, NY
Prometheus Books, 2008) at 147-160. "Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science"
(2005) 95 Am J Public Health 66; reprinted in Putting Philosophy to Work at 161-178. "Scientific
Secrecy and 'Spin': The Sad, Sleazy Saga of the Trials of Remune" (2006) 69:3 Law & Contemp
Probs 47; reprinted in Putting Philosophyto Work at 129-146. "Peer Review and Publication: Lessons
for Lawyers" (2007) 36:3 Stetson L Rev 789. "What's Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An
Essay in Legal Epistemology" (2008) 38:3 Seton Hall L Rev 1053. "Proving Causation: The Holism
of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert"(2008) IV:2 Journal of Biomedical and Health Law 253. "Of
Truth, in Science and in Law" (2008) 73:2 Brook L Rev 985. "Irreconcilable Differences: The Uneasy
Marriage of Science and Law" (2009) 72:1 Law & Contemp Probs 1. "Federal Philosophy of Science:
A Deconstruction-And a Reconstruction" (2010) 5:2 NYU J L & Liberty 394. "T6cnicas forenses,
ciencia impulsada por la litigios, y el problema de los incentivos perversos: lecciones a partir de la
sagaRamirez," in Bustamente, Derechoprobatoriocontempordneo (note 2), 333-345 [English version
available from the author].
4.
Nayha Acharya, "Law's Treatment of Science: From Idealization to Understanding," this
volume, 1-38. Page references in parentheses in my text are all to this article.
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interesting differences between the Canadian and the U.S. experience with
scientific testimony.
1. Gettingstarted
In the U.S., the leading case on scientific testimony is the Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals'-thefirst
case in its history in which it ruled on the standard of admissibility of such
evidence. The issue before the Court was whether Federal Rule of Evidence
[FRE] 702 (1975), according to which expert testimony is admissible if it
is relevant and not otherwise legally excluded, had superseded the Frye
Rule (1923), according to which novel scientific testimony is admissible
only if it is "sufficiently established to be generally accepted in the field to
which it belongs."16 It had, the Court ruled; but federal judges still had the
responsibility to screen proffered expert testimony both for relevance and
for reliability.7
In screening for reliability, Justice Blackmun continued (now writing
only for the majority), courts should look, not to conclusions, but to
methodology, to determine whether supposedly scientific testimony
is really science; i.e., arrived at by the "scientific method." And then,
sketching a quasi-Popperian account of science and its method, he offered
a "flexible list" of indicia to which courts might look in determining
whether proffered scientific testimony is reliable enough to be admitted:
a list that begins, "can [the content of the testimony] be, and has it been,
tested?"'
Since 1993, not only has Daubert been adopted by the majority of
states in the U.S., but its influence has also spread to Colombia,' Italy,'o
Mexico," England and Wales' 2 and, as Ms. Acharya reports, Canada. 3

5.
Daubertv Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc, 509 US 579 (1993).
6. Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 (DC 1923).
7.
Daubert,supranote 5 at 588, 592.
Ibid at 593-595 (these indicia are now known as the "Daubertfactors").
8.
Regla 422, Ley 906 de 2004, C6digo de Procedimiento Penal colombiano (listing indicia strongly
9.
reminiscent of the Daubertfactors, satisfaction of at least one of which is required for admissibility of
new scientific evidence and scientific publications).
10. Italian Corte de Cassazione (Cass Pen Sez IV, 13 diciembre 2010) (acknowledging and
amplifying ideas from Daubert).
11. Tesis Ia. CXXXVII/2006, First Chamber, Mex Sup Ct, SJFG, 9th Epoch, Vol XXV, March 2007,
258 (arguing that admissible scientific testimony must be both relevant and reliable ["fidedigna"], and
listing indicia of reliability familiar from Daubert).
12.
The Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales,
(London: The Stationery Office, 2011) urged that there be a "statutory reliability test" providing that
experts' opinion evidence is admissible only if it is "sufficiently reliable to be admitted," and that trial
judges be provided with "a single list of generic factors to help them apply the reliability test."
13. Acharya, "Law's Treatment of Science," supranote 4, Part I, citing R vJLI, [2000] 2 SCR 600.
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This is itself evidence that the need to manage scientific testimony more
effectively is felt wherever the law calls on science.
But, as the subsequent U.S. legal history suggests, Daubert fell far
short of resolving the problems posed by scientific evidence. The U.S.
Supreme Court has twice returned to questions about the admissibility
of expert testimony: in Joiner (1997), where, ruling that the standard of
review for decisions on the admissibility of such testimony remained
abuse of discretion, it quietly jettisoned Daubert'skey distinction between
the methodology an expert uses and the conclusions he reachesl 4 ; and
in Kumho Tire (1999), where, ruling that Daubert applied to all expert
testimony, it acknowledged that what really matters isn't whether such
testimony is scientific but whether, scientific or not, it is reliable." In 2000
FRE 702 was revised to make explicit the reliability requirement that,
according to Daubert,had been implicit all along-and, indeed, to beef
up this requirement somewhat.' 6 Some courts have made the experiment
of appointing their own experts, with somewhat mixed results"; efforts
have been made to educate judges on some scientific matters-again,
with somewhat mixed results"; and new editions of the federal Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence have grown fatter." In 2009, the Supreme
Court ruled in Melendez-Diaz that defendants have a constitutional right
to have the forensic scientists responsible for evidence against them testify
in court and be cross-examined20 ; and the same year the National Research
Council weighed in with recommendations on how to strengthen forensic
science.2'

14. GeneralElectric Company v Joiner, 522 US 136 (1997).
15. Kumho Tire Comapny Ltd v Carmichael,525 US 137 (1999).
16. The original FRE 702, ratified in 1975, read: "if scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the finder of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." The 2000 version added at the end "..., if (1) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case."
17. Defending Science, supra note 3 at 247.
18. Ibid at 249.
19. Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientic Evidence; (Washington, DC: Federal
Justice Center, 1994); 2d ed (New York: Lexis Publishing, 2000); 3d ed (Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2011) (the first edition ran to 637 pages, the second to 639 pages, but the third
edition is much heftier, at 1,018 pages).
20. Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305 (2009) 129 S Ct 2527.
21. National Research Council (US), Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2009).
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2. Clearingthe ground
Ms. Acharya's approach to the very difficult questions posed by
scientific testimony stresses that both science and the law are "able to
produce legitimate outcomes through adherence to procedure" (p. 7).
Unfortunately, this badly misrepresents both science and law: thinking
in terms of "legitimate outcomes" is already misleading, and thinking in
terms of "legitimate outcomes arrived at by following procedure" even
more so.
Surprisingly, perhaps-despite acknowledging (her note 19) that she
has no expertise in "scientific method and falsification"-Ms. Acharya
makes bold claims about science and its method. Science, she writes,
"is understood as inquiry aiming at empirical truth" (p. 7). But aiming at
truths about empirical reality isn't enough; there must be some distinctive
characteristic that makes inquiry scientific (p. 7). This distinguishing
characteristic, she continues-on the authority of the Oxford English
Dictionary-is the scientific method, which is a matter of "systematic
observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing,
and modification of hypotheses" (pp. 7-8). This understanding of scientific
method, she tells us, "arises out of a concept called 'Falsification' which
constitutes "the conventional concept of how science does and ought to
progress." "Falsification," she continues, "is therefore sometimes referred
to as the philosophy of science" (p. 8). Gosh.

This falsificationist philosophy, Ms. Acharya claims (p. 8), displaced
"Newton's concept of induction," which was unable to acknowledge
either unobservable phenomena or the uncertainty of science22 ; and "gave
rise to the particular methodologies that are currently taught and generally
accepted in the scientific community as the scientific method" (p. 9).
Adherence to this method, "including the validity of experimental design,"
is "internally governed through peer review" (p. 9).23 The legitimacy of

22. Ms. Acharya's description runs together two quite different ideas commonly described
as "inductivist": (i) that scientific theories are arrived at by induction from observations; (ii) that
scientific theories, however arrived at, can be confirmed inductively. Neither form of inductivism is,
as she says, inherently incapable of acknowledging unobservable entities; nor is either form inherently
incapable of acknowledging uncertainty-indeed, the latter form is intended as an account of what
makes scientific theories, despite their uncertainty, better or worse supported by evidence.
23. Ms. Acharya cites John Ziman, Real Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at
226, on the role of testing in science, and at 42-43, on peer review. Ziman does speak of the testing of
scientific hypotheses, but his account of what this involves is not Popperian, but Bayesian; and neither
his brief description of peer review nor the index of his book makes any reference to experimental
design. [On the design of experiments, see Defending Science, supranote 3 at 102 et seq; for examples
of badly-designed studies that have passed peer review at prestigious journals, see "Peer-Review and
Publication," supra note 3 at 802 et seq.]
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science, according to Ms. Acharya, consists simply in faithful adherence
to the procedures prescribed by the scientific method, so characterized.
The dichotomy with which this account begins-either science is
nothing but the desire to discover empirical truths, or else it is simply
a matter of following prescribed procedures-is false. Moreover, there
are obvious difficulties with the OED's account of scientific method:
astronomers, epidemiologists, and sociologists, for example, don't
(can't) routinely go in for conducting experiments; penicillin wasn't
discovered by "systematic observation," and neither was the structure of
DNA; etc.; etc. On top of which, the OED's reference to observation is
incompatible with Popper's insistence that scientists' observations can
play no epistemological role whatsoever-a scientific theory is falsified,
he tells us, when a basic statement incompatible with it is accepted; but
the acceptance of a basic statement, he continues, is purely a matter of
convention, in no way justified, or justifiable, by observation.2 4 Moreover,
the OED's reference to the modification of theories in the light of evidence
is in tension with Popper's animadversions against adapting a falsified
theory rather than dropping it and starting again.25 Finally, Ms. Acharya is
so far from clear about the relation between a philosopher's articulating
an account of the (supposed) scientific method and scientists' using that
method that she often writes in such a way as to invite the objection that,
if the methods that supposedly constitute science really did grow out of
Popper's work, there could have been no scientists before 1934-leaving
Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Boyle, Darwin, Einstein, etc., etc., out in
the cold!
And Ms. Acharya is also mistaken in supposing that Popper's account
is generally, or even widely, accepted. Regrettably, there are still some
scientists (not to mention a few law professors) 26 who have picked up
"scraps of half-remembered Popperism" 27 ; which seems to have been how
a garbled version of Popper's ideas found its way into Justice Blackmun's
dicta in Daubert.2 1 However, Popper's philosophy of science is very far
24. The Logic ofScientific Discovery, supra note 22 at 105 ("... a basic statement cannot be justified
by [experiences, i.e., observations]-no more than by thumping the table.")
25. Ibid at 82, urging that we decide that "in the case of a threat to our system, we will not save it by
any kind of conventionalist stratagem."
26. See, e.g., David Faigman, "To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to Law
as Science and Policy" (1989) 38 Emory U 1005 at 1015-1018. Michael Green, "Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substance Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin
Litigation" (1992) 86 NW UL Rev 643 at 645 (both are criticized in "Federal Philosophy of Science,"
supra note 3 at 417 and 419).
27. David Stove, "The Jazz Age in the Philosophy of Science" in David Stove & Roger Kimball, eds,
Against the Idols of the Age (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers) 3 at 8.
28. "Federal Philosophy of Science," supra note 3 at 410-417.
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from being, as Ms. Acharya supposes, the currently-received view either
in the scientific community or in philosophy of science. The commentator
who observed that Daubert"replaced a legal anachronism [the Frye Rule]
by a philosophical anachronism [Popper's philosophy of science]" 2 though not exactly right about Frye3o-was spot on about the present
standing of Popper's views on the demarcation of science, scientific
method, etc.
More importantly, Popper's philosophy of science is completely
broken-backed. On his account, not only could no scientific theory ever
be shown to be true, or probably true, or reliable, and not only could there
never be evidence supporting any scientific theory, but also-since his
conventionalist account provides no reason to believe that accepted basic
statements are true-no scientific theory could ever be shown to be false,
or probably false, or unreliable, either. If Popper were right, the whole
of (so-called) "scientific knowledge" would be nothing but a mesh of
unwarranted, and unwarrantable, conjectures, in no way anchored in the
world. In short, when you read the fine print, Popper's falsificationism
turns out to be nothing but a thinly-disguised form of skepticism.'
And in any case, the idea of scientific inquiry as simply a matter of
following prescribed procedures is neither plausible nor helpful. It is not
plausible: despite what Bridgman shrewdly described as the "ballyhoo"
philosophers of science have made about scientific method,32 the fact
is that serious scientific work is complex, creative, and messy, with an
improvisational, "just do it" character impossible to capture in a set of
prescribed procedures. And it is no more helpful than it is plausible: in
particular, it tells us nothing about such crucial questions as "how is
scientific inquiry connected to the world?" or "what distinguishes good,
solid, honest, thorough scientific inquiry from bad, flimsy, dishonest,
partial, or skimpy work?"

29. Ronald J Allen, "Expertise and the Daubert Decision" (1994) 84 J Crim L & Criminology 1157
at 1164 (citing Christopher Kamper, "Paradigms Talking Past Each Other: Expert Testimony and
Problems of Translation" (1993) [unpublished, archived at J Crim L & Criminology].
30. The Frye Rule remains the law in a number of states, including New York, California,
Pennsylvania, and Florida-though recent developments suggest that Florida is quietly moving
somewhat closer to Daubert.See Ramirez v State, 810 So 2d 836 (2001), where the Florida Supreme
Court conducted what looked remarkably like a Daubert inquiry to determine whether knife-mark
identification evidence was, as Frye requires, "sufficiently established to be generally accepted in the
field to which it belongs"; leading Prof Michael Saks, in a lecture organized by the Miami-Dade Public
Defender's Office, to describe Florida as a "Fryebert"state.
31. lam not, of course, asking you to accept this on my say-so; but refer you to "Federal Philosophy
of Science," supra note 3 at 399-410, where the argument is made in great detail-and with lavish
quotations from Popper, showing that his position really is as radically negative as I say here.
32. Percy W Bridgman, "On 'Scientific Method' in Reflections ofa Physicist, supranote I at 81.
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While Ms. Acharya writes at some length about the supposed method
of science, she says relatively little about her conception of "legitimacy"
(of the legal system, of adjudicative decisions), except that it too is a
matter of adherence to procedure; and so far as I can tell she offers almost
no argument for this claim except that, by faithfully following procedure,
we arrive at "legal facts" (pp. 13, 16). Certainly the law places a good deal
of weight on procedure3 3; certainly, also, a defendant convicted [acquitted]
as a result of properly-conducted legal procedure is guilty [not guilty] in
the eyes of the legal system concerned. But Ms. Acharya asks her very
weak concept of legitimacy to carry far more weight than it can bear.
For the argument about legal facts applies to every legal system; so the
claim must be that the legitimacy of any legal system consists in faithful
adherence to its own procedures-presumably (since legal systems are
always evolving) in faithful adherence to its own procedures at the time in
question. But this can't possibly be sufficient for legitimacy, at least in any
ordinary sense of the word.
Consider this, from a press report about the then-upcoming trial of Gu
Kailai for the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood, summarizing
key elements of current Chinese criminal procedure: "[d]efense lawyers
are typically given far less time to prepare than prosecutors, and only
limited access to evidence... and even [to] their own clients"; and they
"are not allowed to put their own witnesses on the stand, or to crossexamine prosecution witnesses."34 True, the report also observes that,
as a rule, criminal trials "are designed to confer legitimacy on decisions
taken in secret by Communist Party officials"; but the point being made is
obviously not that decisions taken by the Party behind closed doors really
are made legitimate by such legal proceedings, but that the purpose of the
trial is to confer the appearanceof legitimacy. For (assuming the report is
accurate) these procedures are neither fair nor reasonably likely to lead to
factually sound verdicts; and so it is grossly implausible to suppose that
faithfully following such procedures is sufficient for the legitimacy of the
decision reached in this case, or of the Chinese criminal justice system
more generally. Or consider the principle of traditional Sharia law giving
the testimony of a man twice the weight of the testimony of a woman3 ;
or the Pakistani law requiring four male, Muslim eye-witnesses to prove
33. As I said in "Irreconcilable Differences," supranote 3 at 14.
34. Jeremy Page & Brian Speigle, "On Eve of Chinese Trial, Son Speaks," Wall Street Journal(9
August 2012) A6.
35. Hunt Janin & Andrd Kahlmeyer, Islamic Law: The Shariafrom Muhammad s Time to the Present
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2007) at 32.
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a charge of rape3 6; or, for that matter, the medieval practice of trial by
ordeal." By my lights, faithfully following such procedures is manifestly
insufficient to make a legal system legitimate.
And in any case, Ms. Acharya's conception of what makes a legal
decision or system legitimate implies that what threatens legitimacy is
violations of procedure. So how, exactly, is idealizing science supposed
to be the threat? Some have suggested changes to procedure to handle
scientific evidence better; and some of these proponents of procedural
changes may, for all I know, have been motivated by idealized conceptions
of science. But, so far as I'm aware, no one has ever suggested that an
appropriate reaction to the difficulties of handling such evidence is to
violate procedure. When I noticed Ms. Acharya's frequent references to
"the legal system" (as if there were only one), and her use of words like
"compromise" (pp. 16, 29, 33) to include changes as well as violations
of procedure, I wondered briefly if she could possibly be taking current
Canadian evidentiary procedure to be ideal, incapable of improvement in
any respect-but no, surely she can't be thinking that. In any case, since
the philosophy-of-science cogs of her argument don't engage with the
legal-theory wheels, it's no wonder that when Ms. Acharya turns, in the
final section of her paper, to the recommendations of the Goudge report,
neither her pseudo-Popperian philosophy of science3 ' nor her weak
understanding of legal legitimacy plays any substantive role.
3. Getting real
As I have argued, the habit of using "science," "scientific," etc., as generic
terms of epistemic praise makes it only too easy to forget (as Justice
Blackmun apparently did) that not all, and not only, scientists are good,
honest, thorough inquirers. And it is always better, rather than dismissing
flimsy work as "pseudo-science," to say what, specifically, is wrong with
it. So, eschewing that honorific usage, and setting aside the distracting

36. "Islam and Rape," Editorial, Wall StreetJournal (3 August 2006) A6. (The law was repealed the
following year.)
37. See Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal(Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
38. Ontario, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario, Report ofthe Inquiry into Pediatric
ForensicPathology in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 2008) (Chair, Stephen T Goudge).
39. Ms. Acharya does, however, say over and over (pp 5, 7, 33, 34, 36) that courts shouldn't rely
inappropriately on "scientific constructs" in handling the testimony of non-scientific experts. But her
description of the Daubert factors as "scientific constructs" is itself tendentious: the first (can the
testimony be, and has it been, tested?) is a vague allusion to a half-understood Popperian philosophy of
science; the second (known or potential error rate) is commonsensical, but sadly lacking in specificity;
the third (peer review and publication) is an over-optimistic gesture towards the peer-review system;
and the last (acceptance in the field) is a nod to Frye.
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question of the "demarcation" of science, my Critical-Common-sensist
account begins with the thought that scientific inquiry is continuous with
everyday empirical inquiry: that, as Thomas Huxley once put it, "the man
of science simply uses with scrupulous exactness the methods which we
all... use carelessly."40
If the "scientific method" is supposed to be a method used by all
scientists and only by scientists, and explaining the success of scientific
inquiry, then there is no such thing. Rather, we have the underlying
structure of activities and inferences common to all serious empirical
inquiry: make informed guesses about what might explain a puzzling
phenomenon, figure out their consequences, seek out evidence, see how
well those consequences stand up, and then use your judgment whether to
stick with your conjecture, modify it, or drop it and start again. And then
we have the overlay of "helps" to inquiry that scientists have gradually
developed over hundreds of years: instruments of observation; models and
metaphors; intellectual tools-from Arabic numerals through the calculus
and statistical techniques to computer programs; and the internal social
arrangements that enable the sharing of evidence and keep most scientists,
most of the time, at least reasonably honest.
The underlying structure, which is found in all empirical inquiry, is
not used only by scientists; and the special helps, which are constantly
evolving and often local to a particular scientific field, are not used by all
scientists. But the combination begins to suggest how the sciences have
amplified our unaided human imaginative powers, extended our unaided
evidential reach, and improved our ability to assess where evidence
points, and how strongly.41 Interlocking with my account of the structure
of evidence, the determinants of evidential quality, the way experiential
evidence anchors empirical claims in the world, and how the sharing of
evidence affects warrant,42 this helps explain how the sciences have been
able to achieve so much.
But at the same time my Critical Common-sensism fully acknowledges
that, like all human enterprises, scientific inquiry is fallible, imperfect,
incomplete, and sometimes corrupt, and that its progress is ragged and
uneven; in short, that there is bad science as well as good. Indeed, part of

40. Susan Haack, "Puzzling Out Science" in Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable
Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) 90 at 96-97. Defending Science, supra note 3 at
ch 4. (Ms. Acharya cites this book, but only one chapter [91 seems to play any role in her discussion.)
My source for the quotation from Huxley is JW Grove, In Defence of Science: Science, Technology
and Politics in Modern Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) at 13.
41. Defending Science, supranote 3 at ch 4.
42. Evidence and Inquiry,supra note 2 at ch 4. DefendingScience, supranote 3 at ch 3.

50 The Dalhousie Law Journal

my argument has long been that, while the "technical" helps to scientific
inquiry-the instruments, the computer programs, etc.-have grown better
and better. over time, the "social" helps to honesty and evidence-sharing
have not; and that, as the scientific enterprise gets ever larger and ever
more expensive-and, I added, as the lucrative expert-witness business
booms-these mechanisms are coming under severe strain.43
*

As I wrote in a recent piece on varieties of (metaphysical) realism,"
a legal system can be appraised on a whole variety of dimensions: e.g.,
as more efficient, rather than slow and clumsy; more economical, rather
than saddled with wasteful transaction costs; more civilized, rather than
riddled with arbitrary rules or barbaric penalties; fairer, rather than onesided or biased; more rational-or, better, epistemologically sounderrather than relying on evidentiary procedures bearing no relation to
the truth of the matter. The word that comes to my mind here is (not
"legitimate" but) "decent": a legal system is more decent the better it
does on all these dimensions-which, obviously enough, needn't yield a
linear ordering of better and worse systems, nor identify a uniquely best
system. In the present context, the relevant dimension is the last on my list,
epistemological soundness. 45 A regime of evidentiary rules and procedures
is epistemologically sounder, I would say, to the extent that it ensures that
legal verdicts are factually correct-which, again, guarantees neither a
linear ordering nor a unique epistemologically-soundest system.
For this reason, I'm disinclined to opine about whether adversarial
or inquisitorial approaches are better. But in a 2004 article I offered a
reply to C. S. Peirce's criticism of U.S. legal procedure, that an adversarial
process is inherently ill-suited to discovering the truth: first that, given
the constraints of time and resources inevitable in the legal context,
adversarial procedure can (on certain assumptions) be a good-enough way
of arriving at factually sound verdicts; and second, that what a fact-finder
is asked to determine at trial is not whether the defendant committed the
43. See, e.g., Susan Haack, "Science as Social? Yes and No" in Manifesto ofa PassionateModerate,
supra note 40 at 109.
44. Susan Haack, "The World According to Innocent Realism: The One and the Many, the Real
and the Imaginary, the Natural and the Social," forthcoming in English in Werner Gephardt, ed, The
New Realism (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2013), and in German translation in Markus Gabriel,
ed, Der Neue Realismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013). The concluding section (on philosophy of law)
develops some ideas sketched in "Nothing Fancy: Some Simple Truths about Truth in the Law,"
forthcoming in Spanish translation in Jorge Cerdio, ed, Verdady Derecho (Barcelona: Marcial Pons).
[English version available from the author.]
45. Of course, this is not to say that epistemological soundness is the only, or always the first,
concern.
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crime, but whether the proposition that he did has been established to the
required degree of proof by the admissible evidence presented. And in the
same article I argued, against Jeremy Bentham, that exclusionary rules of
evidence may also (again, on certain assumptions) be part of such a goodenough way of arriving at factually sound verdicts.46
But the fact that exclusionary rules of evidence don't necessarily pull
against what I have called the epistemological soundness of an evidentiary
regime doesn't by itselfjustify any and every such rule. And in the series of
articles mentioned earlier, I argued that Daubertis in many ways flawed.
As I already mentioned, Justice Blackmun's dicta about scientific method
relied on a confused philosophy of science 47 that, not surprisingly, federal
judges seem to have had more than a little difficulty understanding. 48
Moreover, his suggestion that courts look to whether proffered scientific
testimony has been subjected to "peer-review and publication" is not
only over-optimistic about how good a quality-control mechanism prepublication peer review really is, but also so thoroughly ambiguous that
it offers courts no real guidance49 ; and the new concept of "evidentiary
reliability" he crafted created the illusion that scientific truths can be
brought into being by legal decisions."o And, though it contains an element
of truth, the new "Daubert factor" Judge Kozinski added when the case
came back on remand to the Ninth Circuit-that litigation-driven science
is inherently less likely to be reliable than science not undertaken to
bolster a litigant's case-failed to recognize either that marketing-driven
science may also be skewed, or that a good deal of university science is
now funded by drug companies and such; and specifically exempted the
forensic sciences, where the problem of "motivational bias," a.k.a. wishful
thinking, is especially severe."
Why has it proven so difficult to manage scientific testimony
effectively? In part, I have argued, because there are deep tensions
between science and the culture of (at least U.S.) law. First, because of the

46. "Epistemology Legalized," supra note 2 at 368-370 (Peirce), 374-377 (Bentham) in Evidence
and Inquiry, 2d ed.
47. "Trial and Error," supra note 3 (arguing inter alia that Justice Blackmun's ruling in Daubert
ran together two incompatible philosophies of science, Karl Popper's deductivism and Carl Hempel's
inductivism, and confused "reliable" and "scientific").
48. "Federal Philosophy of Science," supranote 3 at 417-427.
49. "Peer-Review and Publication," supra note 3.
50. "Of Truth, in Science and in Law," supranote 3.
51. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 43 F 3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir 1995). See also
"What's Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science?"; "Tdcnicas forenses, ciencia impulsada por los
litigios y el problema de los incentivos perversos," supra note 3.
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strongly adversarial character of the U.S. legal culture-2 in tension with
the investigative nature of science-the experts produced by the parties to
a case are often, in a sense, marginal, i.e., more confident than the majority
of their peers, one way or the other, on still-contested scientific issues
(and are likely to become more confident if they testify repeatedly); as a
result of which the legal system sometimes generates artificial scientific
certainty, and sometimes artificial scientific uncertainty. Second, because
of the law's concern for promptness and finality-in tension with the
fallibilism of the sciences, their openness to revision-it often asks
science for answers when no well-warranted answers are yet available,
and may fail to adapt appropriately when scientific inquiry advances.
Third, because of its stress on formal procedures-in tension with the
pragmatic, improvisational approach of the sciences-scientific subtleties
sometimes congeal into bright-line legal rules." And so on, I continued,
through a whole list of the tensions that make it hard for courts to get the
best information science has to offer. 4
In this context I noted that in the U.S. recent legal responses to these
tensions have included small compromises of adversarialism, in the
experiments with court-appointed experts," and small compromises of the
concern for finality, in jurisdictions that extended statutes of limitations in
response to the possibility that DNA evidence will eventually solve cold
cases." It is unrealistic to expect to find a simple panacea, I argued, let alone
a legal form of words that will magically enable judges to discriminate
52. As this phrase suggests, I am referring here to legal cultures, not simply to legal procedures;
and I see adversarialism, in this sense, as most usefully construed as a matter of degree-the US legal
culture being, probably, more strongly adversarial than that of other common-law countries.
53. For example, some courts have treated evidence of more than doubled risk as a test for
admissibility of specific causation evidence in toxic-tort cases, and some of these have even claimed
(falsely) that "California law requires," or that "Washington law requires" this. See Susan Haack,
"Asuntos arriesgados: sobre la prueba estadistica de la causaci6n especifica," in Diego Papayannis,
ed, Causacion y la atribucion de responsibilidad(Barcelona: Marcial Pons, forthcoming in 2013).
[English version available from the author.]
54. "Truth and Justice, Inquiry and Advocacy, Science and Law" and "Irreconcilable Differences,"
supra note 3.
55. Courts had the power to appoint their own experts long before Daubert, but have used it
somewhat more often since 1993, and especially since Joiner. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 (1975)
explicitly gave federal judges the power to do this; but courts have also appointed their own experts
under FRE 10(a) on "Preliminary Questions," under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (allowing
the appointment of "special masters"), and under their "inherent power" as articulated in Ex parte
Peterson, 253 US 300 (1920). There is a useful summary in Laura E Ellsworth, "Court-Appointed
Experts in State and Federal Courts: From Hens-Teeth to High Priests," (2000) 71 Pennsylvania Bar
Association Quarterly 172-179; and a useful discussion in Reilly v United States, 682 F Supp 150,
152-155 (DRI), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 863 F 2d 149 (1st Cir 1998).
56. "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note 3 at 19. For more details, see Scott Akehurst-Moore,
"An Appropriate Balance?-A Survey and Critique of State and Federal Indictment and Tolling
Statutes" (2006) 6 J High Tech L 213.
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sound science from unsound on questions where reasonable scientists in
the field still disagree. However, I continued, there might be something
to be learned by looking at how legal systems in other technologicallyadvanced countries handle scientific testimony-bearing in mind, of
course, that not only their legal procedures but also their regulatory
arrangements, their health-care provisions, etc., may be significantly
different in relevant ways."
4. Setting the recordstraight
I'm tempted to say, adapting a famous observation of Bishop Berkeley's,
that Ms. Acharya "has kicked up a dust, and then complains that I cannot
see"!" For by now it should be apparent that, because her reading of my
work has been, in both senses, so partial, Ms. Acharya ascribes to me ideas
about science and about the law that I have never endorsed, and in many
cases have explicitly rejected.
On science: Obviously, the idea that I "idealize" science is way off
the mark. Apparently Ms. Acharya didn't register that a crucial theme of
Defending Science-signaled by my sub-title, "Between Scientism and
Cynicism," and articulated unmistakably plainly in the first two pages
of the first chapter 9-is a critique of scientism, i.e., of exaggerated
deference to science. I have urged that we eschew the honorific use of
"science" and its cognates; and argued that, for all its success, science is
not inherently more valuable than, say, art or literature.60 Moreover, the
account of science I have sketched here and developed in detail elsewhere
is pervasively fallibilist and-in the sense in which the word exactly
contrasts with "idealistic"-realistic. No one who idealized science would
say, as I have, that "science is neither sacred nor a confidence trick" 61; or
write, as I have, of the erosion of scientific integrity 62 ; or acknowledge, as
I have, that "like all human enterprises, science is... fallible and imperfect.
At best its progress is ragged, uneven, and unpredictable; moreover, much

57. "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note 3 at 23.
58. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerningthe PrinciplesofHuman Knowledge in The Empiricists
(New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1990) 135 at 137: the difficulties that have amused philosophers
"are entirely owing to ourselves-that we have first raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see."
59. Defending Science, supranote 3 at 17-18.
60. Ibid at 229.
61. "Puzzling Out Science," supranote 40 at 94. The phrase is echoed in the title of chapter I of
Defending Science, supranote 3: "Neither Scared nor a Confidence Trick."
62. Susan Haack, "The Integrity of Science: What It Means, Why It Matters" in Etica elnvestigado
nas Cidncias da Vida-Actas do 10 Seminario do CNECV(2006) 9; reprinted in Putting Philosophy
to Work, supra note 3 at 103-127.
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scientific work is unimaginative or banal, some is weak or careless, and
some outright corrupt." 63
And of course I never say, as Ms. Acharya suggests, that science is
"a better inquiry into factual accuracy than law" (p. 28). Indeed, now
that I think about it, I find I really don't know what this claim means.
Yes, there are some questions that can be answered only by scientific
work in the laboratory or the field; but there are others better tackled by
questioning witnesses, etc. Moreover, even with respect to one, specific
legal system over a specified period, it is enormously difficult to figure
out even approximately what the rate of false convictions is.' And in any
case, the success of the sciences isn't a matter of their getting the right
answers most of the time, but of the gradual construction of a body of
well-warranted theory-and the attendant growth of a vastly larger trashheap of ideas that didn't work out.
Nor, by the way, as Ms. Acharya's suggests (in her note 26), do I deny
that there is such a thing as the scientific method becausePaulFeyerabend
says so; this is a baseless over-interpretation of a passing observation of
mine that Feyerabend's position, though wildly exaggerated, is not without
a grain of truth. 65 As I happily acknowledged, the picture I offer in place
of failed attempts to characterize the supposed "scientific method"-the
underlying procedures of all empirical inquiry, and an overlay of evolving
scientific "helps"-is close kin to (less developed, but suggestive) ideas
found in Huxley, Dewey, Bridgman, Einstein, and others. 66
On law: No, I don't criticize attorneys because they try to find the
best possible evidence for their side of a case (p. 19); in an adversarial
system, this is what their role requires them to do. 67 Nor do I forget that
the fact-finder at trial has a different role from the attorneys for each side
(p. 18)-though I don't agree that fact-finders' task is to decide whether
the defendant did it; rather, as I said earlier, the fact-finders' job is to
determine whether the factual propositions at issue have been established
to the required degree by the (admissible) evidence presented. And no,

63. Susan Haack, "Six Signs of Scientism" (2011) 111.1 Logos & Episteme 75 at 75-76. (First
published, in both Spanish and Chinese translations, in 2010.)
64. But see Michael Risinger, "Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Convict ion Rate" (2007) 97:3 J Crim L & Criminology 761, assessing the rate of factually false
convictions in capital rape-murder cases in the US in the 1980s.
65. "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note 3 at 14.
66. For my critique of various efforts to articulate the scientific method, see Defending Science,
supranote 3 at ch 2; acknowledgments to Bridgman, etc, can be found early in chapter 4. The passing
remark about Feyerabend not being entirely off the wall is in "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note
3 at 14.
67. "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note 3 at 13.
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I don't take adversarialism to be "the root cause" of the difficulties the
U.S. legal system has with scientific evidence (p. 19, my emphasis). The
sometimes carnivorously adversarial culture of U.S. law has, I believe,
contributed to the problems; but the tension between this culture and the
investigative character of science is only one of a whole list of tensions
explored in "Irreconcilable Differences."6
And no, I don't suggest that part of the solution to the problems of
handling scientific testimony in the common-law tradition is to move in
the direction of an inquisitorial system; I simply note that Daubert itself
shifts part of what used to be the responsibility of the jury to the judge,
and that the (still relatively uncommon) use of court-appointed experts is a
small compromise of adversarialism; and suggest that, given how difficult
it has proven to be to manage scientific testimony well, it might be helpful
to ask what we could learn from other jurisdictions' efforts-a suggestion
that I was delighted to see recently taken up, very fruitfully, by Andrew
Jurs.69 Nor, as Ms. Acharya suggests (p. 20), do I dismiss critics of moves
in the direction of inquisitorial procedures as "melodramatic"; this is yet
another baseless over-interpretation, this time of a passing observation that
an article suggesting that civil-law systems are one and all "undemocratic"
was exaggerated.o
To prevent any confusion, it's probably also worth pointing out that
of course nothing in my work suggests that it is desirable to run together
"reliable enough to be admitted" and "reliable enough to meet the
standard of proof"; or that scientific witnesses are competent to answer
legal questions; or that indicia suitable for assessing the reliability of
scientific evidence are necessarily also appropriate for assessing the
reliability of other expert testimony. Indeed, I have written that Justice
Breyer's observation in Kumho Tire, that what matters isn't whether expert
testimony is scientific, but whether it is reliable, is exactly right; though I
added that telling courts that they should use, all, or none of the Daubert
factors, or such other indicia of reliability as seem appropriate, doesn't
exactly give them much substantial guidance.
68. Ibid at 15-21. Section 3 of Ms. Acharya's paper opens with a quotation from this article of mine;
but my words are tendentiously edited: the sentence she quotes in part listed a whole raft of tensions,
but Ms. Acharya's quotation stops short after the first on my list!
69. Andrew Jurs, "Balancing Legal Process with Scientific Expertise: Expert Witness Methodology
in Five Nations and Suggestions for Reform of Post-DaubertReliability Determinations" (2012) 95
Marq L Rev 1329. Canada is one of the nations included in this very detailed study. Given how
thoroughly Ms. Acharya seems to have misunderstood what I had in mind, I was much relieved to see
that Prof Jurs presents his very helpful study precisely as a response to my suggestion.
70. "Truth and Justice," supranote 3 at 156.
71. Ibid at 155.
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5. Looking ahead
It's no fun being a straw woman, and no fun, either, defending myself
against such serious misunderstandings; so let me conclude more
positively, with some ideas about what seem to be interesting differences
between the Canadian and the U.S. experience with scientific testimony.
For one thing, unlike Daubert,which applies to all expert testimony, the
Canadian version, I gather from Ms. Acharya's paper, may arguably be
narrower in scope, applying (like Frye) only to novel scientific testimony.
For another, while Daubert,Joiner,and Kumho Tire are all civil cases, the
leading Canadian cases, I gather, are criminal. The explanation, I suspect,
may lie in significant differences between U.S. and Canadian attitudes to,
and practices regarding, the use of juries in civil trials, contingency fees,
and the assignment of the costs of litigation between the parties. Perhaps
this is something Ms. Acharya might care to explore.7 2

72. My thanks to Mark Migotti for helpful comments on a draft, to Ronald J Allen for helpful
conversation, and to the staff at the University of Miami Law Library, especially Pamela Lucken, for
help in finding relevant materials.

